We introduce a realizability semantics based on interactive learning for full second-order Heyting Arithmetic with excluded middle and Skolem axioms over Σ 0 1 -formulas. Realizers are written in a classical version of Girard's System F and can be seen as programs that learn by interacting with the environment. We show that the realizers of any Π 0 2 -formula represent terminating learning processes whose outcomes are numerical witnesses for the existential quantifier of the formula.
Introduction
In the past years, several computational interpretations of classical logic have been put forward. Under a first classification, they fall into two large categories: direct and indirect interpretations. Among the indirect interpretations one finds the negative translations followed either by Dialectica interpretations (Gödel 1990) , (Spector 1962) or intuitionistic realizability interpretations combined with Friedman's translation (Friedman 1978) . Among the direct interpretations, there are classical realizabilities, Coquand game semantics (Coquand 1995) , cut-elimination and normalization of classical proofs (under Curry-Howard correspondence or not), and the epsilon substitution method (Mints et al. 1996 ) (the Kreisel no-counterexample interpretation (Kreisel 1951) can be obtained as an easy corollary of the other ones).
Such a variety is surprising and on a first sight these interpretations may appear completely different, but it is becoming evident that some unifying concepts exist. Maybe the most general and powerful one is the concept of learning. That is, the computational content of classical proofs can be described in terms of learning programs, that acquire new knowledge about non-computable functions by an intelligent process of making hypotheses and testing them in search of counterexamples. As soon as one adopts this conceptual perspective, all the computational interpretations become clearly related and appear as technical variations on a same theme: learning.
One one hand, indirect interpretations yield, as a result of negative translation, programs using continuations. The deep reason continuations are used is that they are natural tools for implementing backtracking, i.e. the mechanism by which learning programs make guesses, learn about their mistakes and correct them thanks to the new acquired knowledge. In (Berardi et al. 1998 ) realizability interpretation of the negative translation of the axiom of countable choice, continuations are used to build finite approximations of choice functions. The Dialectica interpretation and the Friedman translation from the computational point of view provide ways to capture counterexamples to the hypotheses made by learning programs.
On the other hand, direct interpretations exploit the fact that classical principles have a remarkably immediate computational content when considered as learning devices. In the case of Krivine classical realizability (Krivine 2009 ) the excluded middle A ∨ ¬A is interpreted as a program that assume ¬A as a working hypothesis: if at some point of the computation the program encounters evidence for A (i.e., a realizer of A), then it backtracks, erases everything that depended on the hypothesis ¬A and acquires a realizer of A as new knowledge. Coquand game semantics interprets the excluded middle basically with the same spirit, but in a more semantically meaningful way. Avigad's presentation of the epsilon substitution method (Avigad 2002) instead exploits the learning content of Skolem axioms, which are formulas of the form
∀x∀y.A(x, y) =⇒ A(x, f (x))
The function f is interpreted as an approximation of some choice function, mapping x to a witness (if any exists) for the formula ∃yA(x, y). Whenever an instance A(n, m) =⇒ A(n, f (n)) of a Skolem axiom is false (according to some current approximation of the truth values of A(n, m) and A(n, f (n))) one can correct the function f as to output m on input n.
Realizability Based on Interactive Learning
Given this strong evidence that learning is the key for understanding the computational content of classical proofs, an important goal is to formulate classical realizability semantics explicitly based on learning. Such semantics should describe: first, the nature of the knowledge that programs coming from classical proofs acquire during computations; secondly, how this knowledge evolves during computations. As a consequence of this approach, it should be possible to develop a much finer understanding and control of the backtracking mechanism that interprets classical proofs; in other words: more efficient programs.
A significant step towards this goal has been taken in (Aschieri and Berardi 2010; Aschieri and Berardi 2012) , where it has been introduced a learning-based classical realizability for first-order Heyting Arithmetic HA (also in its finite type version HA ω ) with the excluded middle EM 1 on Σ 0 1 -formulas and Skolem axioms SK 1 over quantifier-free for-mulas. It is a realizability based on states describing the current knowledge of realizers.
The reason why such a fragment has been isolated and studied is that just monotonic learning is sufficient to interpret it. By monotonicity of learning, we intend that learning programs can only increase their knowledge and, once acquired, the knowledge is correct forever. This is the most simple instance of learning, it has special properties † and it is worth to be studied separately; in game semantics, one represents it as simple backtracking (see (Coquand 1991), pag. 90 and (Aschieri 2013) ). In more general settings, learning is more complex. For example, in the case of full first-order Peano Arithmetic, learning is finitely nested, that is knowledge is stratified and the correctness of what is learned at any level depends on what has been learned at the previous levels (see (Avigad 2002) , for an ordinal analysis of this kind of learning, and (Aschieri 2011a; Aschieri 2012) , for a type theoretic analysis). In the case of predicative fragments of Analysis, learning is transfinitely nested (see (Aschieri 2011b) ).
The crucial contribution of Interactive realizability is that it decomposes into two conceptual steps the extraction of programs from classical proofs. The idea is that, first, one extracts an ideal program, obtained with free use of oracles and Skolem functions: this program is very natural to write, it obeys the laws of intuitionistic Heyting semantics (see e.g., (Troelstra and van Dalen 1988) ) and is easy to understand. Then, classical principles suggest how to approximate in a very efficient way the oracles and Skolem functions used in the computation. The result is a model of intelligent programs, able to correct themselves and to learn from the mistakes they make when trying to achieve some goal defined by the usual Heyting intuitionistic reading of logical sentences. In hindsight, our interpretation can be seen as modern version of the epsilon substitution method, refined and rebuilt around the Curry-Howard correspondence for classical logic.
In this work, we extend the Interactive realizability for HA+EM 1 +SK 1 to second-order Heyting Arithmetic HAS plus EM 1 and SK 1 . The Arithmetic HA + EM 1 + SK 1 is realized by adding an oracle for the Halting problem to Gödel's system T and by computationally interpreting EM 1 as a device which effectively learns oracle values during calculations. The resulting notion of realizability is just Kreisel modified realizability (Kreisel 1959) extended with learning (Aschieri and Berardi 2012) . It is thus natural to realize the theory HAS + EM 1 + SK 1 by adding to Girard's system F an oracle for the Halting problem and try again to interpret the excluded middle as a learning device: it is indeed the approach followed in this work. Again, the resulting notion of realizability will be a natural extension of intuitionistic realizability for HAS (for which we basically follow the formulation of (Oliva and Streicher 2008) , but in a Church style) with learning.
We also introduce a technique for witness extraction from proofs of Π 0 2 -formulas. That is, given a realizer t ∀x N ∃y N P (x, y), with P atomic predicate, we extract a non-trivial program taking as input any number n and yielding as output a number m such that P (n, m) holds. In particular, the program uses t as a state-extending operator; we shall † In the field of proof mining, one is indeed interested in exploiting every special property of the theory one is studying. If a constructive interpretation generalizes directly to a stronger theory, there is a good chance that one is losing some constructive information about the theorems of the former theory.
prove that it is enough to extend the state a finite number of times to get a sufficient amount of information to compute a witness.
Plan of the Paper
In section §2 we introduce the term calculus in which realizers will be written, namely an extension of Girard's system F plus a constant symbol for a Skolem function Φ.
In section §3, we introduce our notion of realizability based on interactive learning for HAS + EM 1 + SK 1 .
In section §4, we present our technique of witness extraction.
The Term Calculus F Class
In this section we introduce the typed lambda calculi that we shall use to define interactive realizability: system F and F Class . F is a completely standard extension of Girard's system F (see (Girard 1989) ) with some syntactic sugar: numerals, booleans, primitive recursion at all types, if-then-else, pairs, finite partial functions over N and simple primitive recursive operations over them. Equivalently, F may be seen as an extension of Gödel's system T (as one may find it in the exposition of (Girard 1989) ) with polymorphism. F Class is obtained from F by adding on top of it a Skolem function symbol Φ : N → (N → N) of the same Turing degree of an oracle for the Halting problem. The symbol is totally inert from the computational point of view and so realizers will always be computed with respect to some approximation of the Skolem function represented by Φ.
Updates
In order to define F, we have first to define the concept of update, which is nothing but a finite partial function over N. We use the appellative "update", because realizers of atomic formulas will return finite partial functions as new pieces of information that they have learned about the Skolem function Φ; updates represent new associations inputoutput that are intended to correct (and in this sense, update) wrong oracle values used in computations.
Definition 1 (Updates and Consistent Union). We define:
1 An update set U , shortly an update, is a finite set of triples of natural numbers representing a finite partial function from N 2 to N.
minus all triples of U 2 which are inconsistent with some triple of U 1 .
We think of a triple (a, n, m) contained in an update as the code of a possible witness m for a Σ 0 1 -formula ∃y.P a (n, y). The fact that every update is a partial function allows in each update at most one witness for each formula ∃y.P a (n, y).
U 1 U U 2 is a non-commutative operation: whenever a triple of U 1 and a triple of U 2 are inconsistent, we arbitrarily keep the triple of U 1 and we reject the triple of U 2 , therefore for some U 1 , U 2 we have U 1 U U 2 = U 2 U U 1 . U is a "learning strategy", a way of selecting a consistent subset of
It is immediate to show that U is an associative operation on the set of updates, with neutral element ∅, with upper bound U 1 ∪ U 2 , and returning a non-empty update whenever U 1 ∪ U 2 is non-empty.
In fact, the whole realizability semantics is a Monad (Berardi and de' Liguoro 2008) . In (Berardi and de' Liguoro 2008) , it is proved that a fragment of our realizability semantics is parametric with respect to the definition we choose for U. Any associative operation U, with neutral element ∅ and satisfying the two properties of Lemma 1, defines a different but sound realizability semantics, corresponding to a different "learning strategy".
2.2. The System F System F is formally described in figure 1 . A numeral is a term of the form S(S(. . . 0)). For notational simplicity, we assume in the following that updates are made of triples of numerals. Terms of the form if T t 1 t 2 t 3 will be written in the more legible form if t 1 then t 2 else t 3 , whenever T can be inferred from the context. For every update U ∈ U, there is in F a constant U : U, where U is a new base type representing U. We write ∅ for ∅. In F, there are four operations involving updates (see figure 1 ):
1 The first operation is denoted by the constant is : U → N 2 → Bool. is takes as arguments an update constant U and two numerals a, n; it returns True if (a, n, m) ∈ U for some numeral m (that is, if the pair (a, n) is in the domain of the partial function U ); it returns False otherwise.
2 The second operation is denoted by the constant get : U → N 2 → N. get takes as arguments an update constant U and two numerals a, n; it returns m if (a, n, m) ∈ U for some numeral m (that is, if (a, n) belongs to the domain of the partial function U ); it returns 0 otherwise.
3 The third operation is denoted by the constant mkupd : N 3 → U. mkupd takes as arguments three numerals a, n, m and transforms them into (the constant coding) the update {(a, n, m)}.
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The forth operation is denoted by the constant : U 2 → U. takes as arguments two update constants and returns the update constant denoting their consistent union.
We observe that the constants is, get, mkupd are just syntactic sugar and may be avoided by coding finite partial functions into natural numbers. We assume having in system F some terms ⇒ Bool : Bool → Bool → Bool, ¬ Bool : Bool → Bool, ∨ Bool : Bool → Bool → Bool . . ., implementing boolean connectives. If t 1 , . . . , t n , t ∈ F have type Bool and are made from free variables all of type Bool, using boolean connectives, we say that t is a tautological consequence of t 1 , . . . , t n in F (a tautology if n = 0) if all boolean assignments making t 1 , . . . , t n equal to True in F also make t equal to True in F. Some terms of Gödel's system T will be used to represent predicates.
Definition 2 (Predicates of system T).
1 A binary predicate of T is any closed normal term P : N 2 → Bool of Gödel's system T.
2 We assume P 0 , P 1 , P 2 , . . . is an arbitrary enumeration of all binary predicates of T.
As usual when working with polymorphic lambda calculus, one can define sum types A + B and existential types ∃XA. We shall need A + B in order to define functionals which return either objects of type A or of type B, without knowing in advance of which type. This situation occurs when one needs to define a realizer a disjunction A ∨ B, which has either to return a realizer of A or a realizer of B. Similarly, we shall need ∃XA in order to define functionals which return a pair of a type B and an object of type A[B/X], without knowing in advance the type B. This situation occurs when one needs to define a realizer of a formula ∃XA, which has either to return a type B and a realizer of A[B/X], for some B.
Definition 3 (Sum Types, Existential Types).
1 For all types A, B of system F, we define a type
where X is a variable not occurring free in A, B.
2 For every term u : A of system F , we define a term
3 For every term u : B of system F , we define a term
Typing Rules for Variables and Constants
x A : A 0 : N S : N → N True : Bool False : Bool U : U (for every U ∈ U) : U → U → U is : U → N → N → Bool get : U → N → N → N mkupd : N → N → N → U if : ∀X. Bool → X → X → X R : ∀X. X → (N → (X → X)) → N → X
Typing Rules for Composed Terms
with X non free in the types of the free variables of u ΛXu :
, 1} π i u : A i Reduction Rules All the usual reduction rules for system F (see (Girard 1989) ) plus the rules for recursion, if-then-else and projections
, 1 plus the following ones, assuming a, n, m be numerals:
For all types A of F, we define a type
where Y is a variable not occurring free in A. System F is obtained from system T adding polymorphism and new operations on atomic types. The following definition formalizes what has been done and it useful for defining arbitrary extensions of F with arbitrary functions over natural numbers; we shall need such extensions for adjoining non-computable functions to F.
Definition 4 (Functional set of rules). Let C be any set of constants, each one of some type A 1 → . . . → A n → A, for some A 1 , . . . , A n , A ∈ {Bool, N, U}. We say that R is a functional set of reduction rules for C if R consists, for all c ∈ C and all a 1 : A 1 , . . . , a n : A n closed normal terms of F, of exactly one rule ca 1 . . . a n → a, for some closed normal term a : A of F.
Any extension of F with constants and even non-computable functional sets of rules, is strongly normalizing and has the uniqueness-of-normal-form property.
Theorem 2. Assume that R is a functional set of reduction rules for C (def. 4). Then F + C + R enjoys strong normalization and weak-Church-Rosser (uniqueness of normal forms) for all closed terms of atomic types.
Proof. For strong normalization, see (Berger 2005) or just use standard reducibility arguments, as in (Girard 1989) . Weak Church-Rosser is also standard.
The following normal form theorem also holds.
Lemma 3 (Normal Form Property for F +C +R). Assume that R is a functional set of reduction rules for C. Assume A is either an atomic type or a product type. Then any closed normal term t ∈ F of type A is: a numeral n : N, or a boolean True, False : Bool, or an update constant U : U, or a constant of type A, or a pair u, v : B × C.
Proof. By induction over t. For some sequence v of closed types and terms, either t is (λx.u) v, or t is (ΛX.u) v or t is u, w v, or t is x v for some variable x, or t is c v for some constant c.
The only case left is t = c v : A. If t = 0 we are done, if t = S(u) we apply the induction hypothesis to u, if t = True, False : Bool or t = U : U or t is a constant of C we are done. Otherwise either t = (RU s 1 s 2 n) t or t = (ifU ba 1 a 2 ) t or t = π i (z) w, or t = is u n m : N, or t = get u n m : N, or t = u 1 u 2 : U, or t = mkupd n m l or t = c v, with c ∈ C and v 1 : A 1 , . . . , v k : A k , and A i atomic for every i . The proper subterms n, m, l : N, b : Bool,
A k of t have atomic or product type and are closed normal. By induction hypothesis they are, respectively, numerals, booleans, pairs, constants. In all cases, t is not normal.
The System F Class
We now define a classical extension of F, that we call F Class , with a constant symbol Φ : N 2 → N denoting a non-computable map of the same Turing degree of an oracle for the Halting problem. We shall use the elements of F Class to represent non-computable realizers.
Definition 5 (Systems F Class and T Class ). Define F Class = F + Φ and T Class = T + Φ, where Φ : N 2 → N is a new constant symbol and T is Gödel's system.
For every numeral a, Φa -which we shall denote with Φ a -represents a Skolem function for the formula ∃y N P a xy, taking as argument a number x and returning some y such that P a xy if any exists, and an arbitrary value otherwise. There is no set of computable reduction rules for the constant Φ, and therefore no set of computable reduction rules for F Class .
Each (in general, non-computable) term t ∈ F Class is associated to a set {t[s] |s ∈ F, s : N 2 → N} ⊆ F of computable terms we call its "approximations", one for each term s : N 2 → N of F, which is thought as a computable approximation of the oracle Φ.
Definition 6 (Approximation at state s). We define:
1 A state is a closed term of type N 2 → N of F. We define S := N 2 → N. 2 Assume t ∈ F Class and s is a state. The "approximation of t at state s" is the term t[s] of F obtained from t by replacing each constant Φ with s.
We interpret any t[s] ∈ F as a learning process evaluated with respect to the information taken from an approximation s of Φ. Here we consider an approximation of Φ to be an arbitrary term s : S; s may be correctly in agreement with Φ on some arguments, but wrong on other ones. Consequently, we are going to consider the set of (a, n) such that P a ns a (n) = True as the real "domain" of s (again, with s a (n) we shall sometimes denote san). We are also going to define a term ⊕ which takes as arguments a term f : N 2 → N and an update U and changes the values of f according to U . This is one of the fundamental operations of our computational model: realizers will compute updates to correct wrong values of oracle approximations with new good values that they have previously learned and stored in the updates. Last, using Φ, we are going to define for every numeral a the oracle X a , which takes as argument a numeral n and returns the truth value of ∃y N P a ny.
Definition 7 (Domain, Updates of Functions, Oracle X a ). We define:
1 If s is a state, we denote with dom(s) the set of pairs of numerals (a, n) such that P a ns a (n) = True. If U is an update, we denote with dom(U ) the set of pairs of numerals (a, n) such that (a, n, m) ∈ U and P a nm = True; we say that U is sound if for every (a, n, m) ∈ U , we have P a nm = True.
2 We define a term ⊕ : (N 2 → N) → U → (N 2 → N) as follows:
We will write t 1 ⊕ t 2 in place of ⊕t 1 t 2 .
3 For every numeral a : N, we define a term X a : N → Bool as follows:
We introduce now a notion of convergence for families of terms {t[s i ]} i∈N ⊆ F, defined by some t ∈ F Class and indexed over a set {s i } i∈N of states. Informally, "t convergent" means that the normal form of t[s i ] eventually stops changing when the approximation s i of Φ gets better and better. If s, r are states, we formalize what it means that r is at least as good an approximation as s by defining:
Intuitively, if s ≤ r, then r can be obtained by correcting some of the values of s that make s a wrong approximation of Φ. We say that a sequence {s i } i∈N of states is a weakly increasing chain of states (is w.i. for short), if
Definition 8 (Convergence). Assume that {s i } i∈N is a w.i. sequence of states, and
2 u converges if u converges in every w.i. sequence of states.
We remark that if u is convergent, we do not ask that u is convergent to the same value on all w.i. chain of oracle approximations. The value attained by u may depend on the information contained in the particular chain from which u gets the knowledge.
Theorem 4 (Convergence Theorem). Assume t ∈ F Class is a closed term of atomic type A (A ∈ {Bool, N, U}). Then t is convergent.
Proof. (Classical).
For every function S mapping pairs of numerals into numerals, we define some (in general, non computable) functional set of reduction rules R(S) for Φ and for F Class .
If s is a state, we define R(s) := {Φ a n → m | s a (n) = m, with a, n, m numerals} By theorem 2, for any S and s, F Class + R(S) and F Class + R(s) are strongly normalizing and weak-CR for all closed terms of atomic type. Claim. If s is a state, the normal form of t in F Class + R(s) is equal to the normal form of t[s] in F.
Proof of the Claim. By induction over the size of the reduction tree of t. If t is normal, then by lemma 3 it is a numeral, a boolean or a constant; moreover, t = Φ, for Φ : N 2 → N. Then we are done, since t = t[s]. If t is not normal, then it reduces in one step reduction to some t . If we show that t[s] reduces t [s] in F, we obtain the claim by induction hypothesis. The only non self-evident case is when a redex not already in t is contracted in t [s] . Such redex must be of the form Φ a n, with n numeral, and t results from t by replacing the redex with m, where m is a numeral and s a (n) = m. But then t [s] can as well be obtained from t[s] by normalizing the redex s a (n) of t [s] .
For the rest of the proof, let {s i } i∈N be a w.i. chain of states. Define
, since {s i } i∈N is weakly increasing. By strong normalization, t has a finite reduction in normal form in F Class + R(S ω ). Therefore in this reduction are used only finitely many reduction rules from R(S ω ). Moreover, if Φ a n → m is any of such rules, then either there exists i such that (a, n) ∈ dom(s i ) and s i (a, n) = m, and so for every j ≥ i, s i (a, n) = s j (a, n) (for {s i } i∈N ∈ w.i.); or it does not, and so for every j, s j (a, n) = s 0 (a, j) (again, {s i } i∈N ∈ w.i.). Therefore, all the reduction rules used to obtain the normal form w of t in F Class + R(S ω ) are already in R(s n ), for some numeral n, and thus w is the normal form of t also in F Class + R(s n ), and in F Class + R(s m ) for all m ≥ n. Thus, by the Claim, the normal forms in F of all t[s m ] with m ≥ n are the same, as we wished to show.
Remark 1. The idea of the proof of theorem 4 corresponds exactly to the intuition that during any computation, the oracle Φ is consulted a finite number of times and hence asked for a finite number of values. When the approximation s n of Φ is great enough, we can substitute Φ with s n and we obtain the same oracle values and hence the same results.
3. An Interactive Learning-Based Notion of Realizability for HAS + EM 1 + SK 1
In this section we introduce a notion of realizability based on interactive learning for HAS + EM 1 + SK 1 , Second Order Heyting Arithmetic plus Excluded Middle on Σ 0 1 -formulas
and Skolem axioms
then we prove our main Theorem, the Adequacy Theorem: "if a closed arithmetical formula is provable in HAS + EM 1 + SK 1 , then it is realizable". We first define the formal system HAS + EM 1 + SK 1 . We represent atomic predicates of HAS + EM 1 + SK 1 with (in general, non-computable) closed terms of T Class of type Bool.
Terms of HAS + EM 1 + SK 1 may include the function symbol Φ, denoting the Skolem function for ∃y N P a xy.
Remark 2. Our realizability can be formulated already for the standard language of Arithmetic: we add non computable functions to the language for greater generality and to interpret Skolem axioms in addition to EM 1 . Of course, HAS already proves the comprehension axiom and thus HAS + EM 1 proves the existence of a Skolem function for ∃y N P a xy, which is the formula ∃XA, where
Indeed, as a witness for X one may take the formula
Then using EM 1 one may prove A[S/X] and thus ∃XA. However, such an approach is fairly inefficient, because it requires to define a particular Skolem function, and it usually ends by defining a map always returning the minimum witness, as in the example, or by imposing some arbitrary criterion on the possible witnesses.
Instead, our approach of adding SK 1 is more direct and efficient: our realizer of SK 1 will not waste resources by always constructing a minimum witness, but it will keep the first one it finds. The addition of non-computable functions to the language of Arithmetic requires in fact a non-trivial modification of the realizability semantics. For example, there is no formulation of Krivine classical realizability (Krivine 2009 ) realizing the formula SK 1 as it is written. This is due to the fact that in order to represent Arithmetic in pure second-order logic, one needs to relativize all the first-order quantifiers to the usual predicate Nat(x), which defines the concept of natural number. This is not enough, though, because one then must ensure that for every first-order term t in the language it is possible to prove Nat(t). There is not any problem in the case of a term language with function symbols representing recursive functions; however, if Φ is added, there would be the axiom ∀x.Nat(x) → Nat(Φx). But then, by the standard results on storage operators showing that it is always possible to effectively recover the number denoted by t from a realizer of Nat(t), one would obtain that Φ is computable, if the axiom is realizable.
Language of HAS
We now define the language of the arithmetical theory HAS + EM 1 + SK 1 .
Definition 9 (Language of HAS+EM 1 +SK 1 ). The language L Class of HAS+EM 1 +SK 1 is defined as follows.
1 The terms of L Class are all t ∈ T Class , such that t : N and FreeVar(t) ⊆ {x We denote with ⊥ the atomic formula False. We shall write natural number variables in lower case characters x N , y N , z N , α N and predicate variables in upper case characters X, Y, Z. We shall often omit the types of natural number variables, writing for instance ∀x A in place of ∀x N A. If P is an atomic formula of L Class in the free variables x 1 , . . . , x n and t 1 , . . . , t n are terms of L Class , with P (t 1 , . . . , t n ) we shall denote the atomic formula
We defined ⇒ Bool : Bool, Bool → Bool as a term implementing implication, therefore, to be accurate, formulas of the form P a (t, u) ⇒ Bool P a (t, Φ a t) are not an implication between two atomic formulas, but they are equal to the single atomic formula Q, where
Any atomic formula A of L Class is a boolean term of T Class , therefore for any state s we may form the "approximation"
we replace the Skolem function Φ we have in A by its approximation s.
Our definition of realizability provides a formal semantics for HAS + EM 1 + SK 1 , and therefore also for the more usual language of Arithmetic HAS + EM 1 , in which all terms represent recursive maps.
From now onwards, for every pair of terms t 1 , t 2 of system F, we shall write t 1 = t 2 if they are the same term modulo the equality rules corresponding to the reduction rules of system F (equivalently, if they have the same normal form).
s-Saturated Sets
We now turn to the definition of a fundamental concept: the notion of s-saturated set of type A. The concept arises naturally if one tries, as a first thought, to define realizability for second-order formulas ∀XA in terms of realizability of all formulas A[λzB(z)/X]. Of course, such definition would not be a well-founded one with respect to the logical structure of formulas. In the case of second-order Heyting Arithmetic, one usually takes an extensional approach to solve this issue (see (Oliva and Streicher 2008) , for example, who essentially follow (Krivine 1990) ). Since the computational meaning of a formula is determined by the set of its realizers, one replaces the quantification over formulas with quantification over saturated sets of lambda terms, i.e. arbitrary sets of terms closed under intensional equality. Then, for quantification over predicates, one may define real-izability for ∀XA in terms of realizability of A[F/X], for every function F from natural numbers to saturated set of terms. The idea is that F represents an abstract proposition over natural numbers.
Interactive realizability, however, is relativized to states, i.e. to terms s : S. Consequently, also intensional equality of terms of F Class and hence saturation are relativized to states. The idea is that each world/state s determines a notion of equality between terms of F Class , because during computations one replaces Φ with its approximation s. Remark 3. We shall not assign boolean values to propositions of the form F n, let alone arbitrary formulas, since we are interested in determining what is a construction of a formula rather than when a formula is true. Realizability will indeed give a meaning to the expression F n by the set [ [F ] ](n), which specifies in an extensional way what it means to "construct" F n in a world/state s. More in general, the meaning of an arbitrary formula in a state s will just be a description of what is a construction of it in the state s, and thus will be determined by all its possible realizers in the state s. The (unconditional) meaning of an arbitrary formula will just be the set of programs that are valid realizers of it in every state s; if this set is not empty, the formula is consider "true" in our framework.
Interactive Realizability
For every formula A of L 
|∃XA| = ∃X|A|
We now define the realizability relation t C is closed, where t ∈ F Class , C ∈ L + Class is closed and t : |C|.
Definition 12 (Interactive Realizability). Assume s is a state, t is a closed term of
Class is a closed formula, and t : |C|. We define first the relation t s C by induction and by cases according to the form of C: 1 t s Q if and only if: The ideas behind the definition of s are the following. A realizer is a term t of F Class , possibly containing the non-computable Skolem function Φ; if such function was computable, t would be an intuitionistic realizer. Since in general t is not computable, we calculate its approximation t[s] at state s. t is an intelligent, self-correcting program, representing a proof/construction depending on the state s. The realizer interacts with the environment, which may provide a counter-proof, a counterexample invalidating the current construction of the realizer. But the realizer is always able to turn such a negative outcome into a positive information, which consists in some new piece of knowledge learned about the Skolem function Φ.
There are two important concepts that are useful to understand the interaction of a realizer with the environment: a realizer receives as input tests and produces as output predictions.
-Predictions.
-A realizer t of A ∨ B uses s to predict which one between A and B is realizable:
if π 0 t[s] = True then A is realizable, and if π 0 t[s] = False then B is realizable. -A realizer u of ∃xA uses s to compute π 0 u[s] = n and to predict that n is a witness for ∃xA (i.e. that A[n/x] is realizable). -A realizer of ∃XA predicts the existence of a witness [ [F ] ] : N → Sat B (s) for ∃XA (i.e. that A[F /X] is realizable).
-Tests.
-A realizer t of a universal formula ∀x N A or ∀XA takes a natural number n or constant F as a challenge coming from the environment to provide a construction of A[n/x] or A [F /X] , whose correctness will be tested at the end of computation.
-A realizer of A → B takes a realizer of A as a challenge coming from the environment to provide a construction of B, whose correctness will be tested at the end of the computation. -A realizer of A ∧ B may be challenged to construct A as well as B, and again the correctness of the construction will be tested at the end of computation. -A realizer of an atomic formula Q or F u comes after a series of predictions and challenges that have been provided to test the construction of a complex formula; now it is performed a final test. In the case of F u, one just verifies that the realizer satisfies the notion of construction embodied by the function [ [F ] ]. In the case of a formula Q of T Class , the realizer computes the formula Q in the state s as an experiment. Since the predictions of realizers need not be always correct, it is possible that a realized atomic formula is actually false; we may have t s Q and Q[s] = False in F. If Q, though predicted to be true, is instead false, then a counterexample has been encountered; this means that the approximation s of Φ is still inadequate. In this case, t[s] = ∅ by definition of t s Q, and the atomic realizer t takes s and extends it to a larger state s , union of s and t [s] . That is to say: the construction of a realizer is wrong in a particular state, the realizer must learn from its mistakes. The point is that after every learning, the actual state grows, and if we ask to the same realizer new predictions, we will obtain "better" answers.
Indeed, we can say more about this last point. Suppose for instance that t A∨B and let {s i } i∈N be a w.i. sequence of states. Then, since t : Bool×|A|+|B|, then π 0 t : Bool is a closed term of F Class , converging in {s i } i∈N to a boolean by theorem 4; thus the sequence of predictions {π 0 t[s i ]} i∈N eventually stabilizes, and hence a witness is eventually learned in the limit.
In the atomic case, in order to have t s Q, we stipulate as second requirement that
Together with the first requirement, that is to say: if t[s] contains no new information about Φ for correcting wrong values of s, then t must ensure the truth of Q with respect to s. Hence search for truth will be for us computation of a zero -a s such that t[s] = ∅ -driven by the excluded-middle instances and the Skolem axioms used by proofs, rather than exhaustive search for counterexamples.
The next proposition tells that realizability at state s respects the notion of equality of F Class terms, when the latter is relativized to state s. That is, if two terms are equal at the state s, then they realize the same formulas at the state s. Hence, the extensional notion of s-saturated set comprehends the intensional notion of realizability of a formula at state s.
Proposition 1 (Saturation). The following hold:
Proof. By straightforward induction on A.
The next proposition tells that, in the context of realizability, quantification over maps from N to s-saturated sets definable through realizability is the same as quantification over definable sets of natural numbers. It is crucial in order to prove that t s ∀XA implies t s A[λxB(x)/X] for every formula B(x) in the only free variable x. and so
3 The other cases are straightforward.
Example 1. The most remarkable feature of our Realizability Semantics is the existence of a realizer for EM 1 . Assume that P a is a predicate of T and define
Indeed E a , as we explain in a moment, realizes its associated instance of EM 1 .
Proof. As in (Aschieri and Berardi 2012 ).
E a works as follows. It uses the oracle X a (definition 7) to make predictions about which one between ∃y P a (m, y) and ∀y¬ Bool P a (m, y) is true. X a , in turn, relies on the approximation s of Φ to make its own prediction. If X a m[s] = False, given any n, ¬ Bool P a (m, n) is predicted to be true; if it is not the case, we have a counterexample and mkupd a m n returns {(a, m, n)}, that is, it requires to correct the state s as to output n on input (a, m). On the contrary, if X a m[s] = True, there is unquestionable evidence that ∃y P a (m, y) holds; namely, P a ms a (m) = True by definition 7 of X; then Φ a m[s] = s(m) is computed and returned. This is the basic mechanism by which learning is implemented: every state extension is linked with an assumption about an instance of EM 1 which has been used and turned out to be wrong (this is the only way to come across a counterexample); in next computations, the actual state will be bigger, the realizer will not do the same error, and hence will be "wiser".
Curry-Howard Correspondence for HAS
In figure 2, we define a standard natural deduction system for HAS + EM 1 + SK 1 (see (Sorensen and Urzyczyn 2006) , for example) together with a term assignment in the spirit of Curry-Howard correspondence for classical logic.
We replace purely universal axioms (i.e., Π 0 1 axioms) with Post rules, which are inferences of the form Γ P 1 Γ P 2 · · · Γ P n Γ P where P 1 , . . . , P n , P are first-order atomic formulas of L Class (i.e., without set variables) such that for every substitution
. . , n k and states s, P 1 σ = . . . = P n σ = True implies P σ = True. Let now eq : N 2 → Bool a term of Gödel's system T representing equality between natural numbers. Among the Post rules, we have the Peano axioms Γ eq S(x) S(y)
and axioms of equality Γ eq x x Γ eq x y Γ eq y z Γ eq x z Γ P (x) Γ eq x y Γ P (y) and for every P 1 , P 2 such that P 1 = P 2 is an equation of Gödel's system T (equivalently, P 1 , P 2 have the same normal form in T), we have the rule
We also have a Post rule Γ P 1 Γ P 2 · · · Γ P n Γ P for every classical propositional tautology P 1 → . . . → P n → P , where for i = 1, . . . , n, P i , P are atomic formulas obtained as combination of other atomic formulas by the Gödel's system T boolean connectives. As title of example, we have the rules
Finally, we have a Post rule of case reasoning for booleans. For any atomic formula P and any atomic formula A [P ] we have:
The connectives ∨ Bool and ∨ have the same meaning but they are syntactically different: for every atomic formula P , we consider P ∨ Bool ¬ Bool P an atomic formula and P ∨¬ Bool P a compound formula. P ∨ Bool ¬ Bool P is an axiom, while we may derive HAS P ∨ ¬ Bool P by case reasoning. The term decorating the conclusion of a Post rule is of the form u 1 · · · u n . In this case, we have n different realizers, whose learning capabilities are put together through a sort of union. By Lemma 1, if
all u i "have nothing to learn". In that case, each u i must guarantee A i to be true, and therefore the conclusion of the Post rule is true, because true premises P 1 , . . . , P n spell a true conclusion P .
Remark 4. We observe that the full ex-falso-quodlibet axiom is not in our system, since there are no rules neither axioms to derive ⊥ → Xt. Nevertheless, we have the ex-falsoquodlibet restricted to first-order formulas, thus we cannot say to be in minimal Arithmetic, where usually ⊥ is replaced by 0 = S(0). We leave the axiom out of the system because is not very interesting from the computational point of view, because it is usually interpreted by dummy realizers. On top of that, the ex-falso is not realizable according to our semantics, since there is no closed term t of type |∀X. ⊥ → X0| = ∀X. U → X in system F (otherwise ΛX. tX∅ would have type ∀XX, which is not possible by normalization and the argument used for proving lemma 3). Furthermore, the trivial translation mapping atomic formulas of the form Xt to Xt∨⊥ eliminates the need of the full ex-falso axiom in the system HAS + EM 1 + SK 1 .
We now prove our main result of this section: every theorem of HAS + EM 1 + SK 1 is realizable. As usual in adequacy proofs for realizability, we prove a stronger version of the theorem, suitable to be proved by induction on proofs.
Theorem 5 (Adequacy Theorem). Suppose that Γ w : A in the system HAS + EM 1 + SK 1 , with Γ = x 1 : A 1 , . . . , x n : A n , and that the free variables of the formulas occurring in Γ and A are among α 1 : N, . . . , α k : N, X 1 , . . . , X m . Fix any state s, numerals n 1 , . . . , n k and assume
. . , t n are terms such that
with v. We have
for all formulas C. We denote with = the provable equality in F Class . We proceed by induction on w. Consider the last rule in the derivation of Γ w : A:
Contexts With Γ we denote contexts of the form x 1 : A 1 , . . . , xn : An, with x 1 , . . . , xn proof variables and A 1 , . . . , An formulas of LClass.
∀α N A where t is a term of LClass and α N does not occur free in any formula B occurring in Γ.
Existential Quantification (1)
: C where, in the second rule, α N is not free in C nor in any formula B occurring in Γ.
Universal Quantification (2)
∀XA where B(x) is a formula of LClass and in the second rule X does not occur free in any formula occurring in Γ.
Existential Quantification (2)
Γ u|C|t : C where, in the second rule, X is not free in C nor in any formula occurring in Γ.
where n > 0 and P 1 , P 2 , . . . , Pn, P are first-order atomic formulas of LClass, and the rule is a Post rule for equality, for a Peano axiom, for a classical propositional tautology or for booleans.
Post Rules with no Premises
Γ ∅ : P where P is a first-order atomic formula of LClass and an axiom of equality or a classical propositional tautology.
EM1
Γ Ea : ∀x. ∃y Pa(x, y) ∨ ∀y¬BoolPa(x, y) SK1 2 If it is the ∧I rule, then w = u, t , A = B ∧ C, Γ u : B and Γ t : C. Therefore, w = u, t . By induction hypothesis, π 0 w = u s B and π 1 w = t s C; so, by definition, w s B ∧ C = A.
3 If it is a ∧E rule, say left, then w = π 0 u and Γ u : A ∧ B. So w = π 0 u s A, because u s A ∧ B by induction hypothesis.
4 If it is the → E rule, then w = ut, Γ u : B → A and Γ t : B. So w = ut s A, for u s B → A and t s B by induction hypothesis.
5 If it is the → I rule, then w = λx |B| u, A = B → C and Γ, x : B u : C. Suppose now that t s B; we have to prove that wt s C. By induction hypothesis on u, u s C. By trivial equalities and induction hypothesis
6 If it is a ∨I rule, say left, then w = True, ι 0,|B|,|C| (u) , A = B ∨ C and Γ u : B. So, w = True, ι 0,|B|,|C| (u), and hence π 0 w = True. We indeed verify that u s B with the help of induction hypothesis.
7 If it is a ∨E rule, then
and v s B. Hence, by definition 3 of ι 0,|B|,|C| and by (1)
By induction hypothesis w 1 s B → D. 9 If it is the (first order) ∀I rule, then w = λα N u, A = ∀αB and Γ u : B (with α not occurring free in the formulas of Γ). So, w = λα N u, since α = α 1 , . . . , α n . Let n be a numeral; we have to prove that wn = u[n/α] s B[n/α], which amounts to show that the induction hypothesis can be applied to u. For this purpose, it is enough to observe that for i = 1, . . . , n
If it is the (first order) ∃E rule, then ∀XB. So, w = u|C|. Let C be such that |C | = |C|, st(C ) = s and
(C is well defined by proposition 1). By inductive hypothesis u s ∀XB and so u|C| s B[C /X]. By proposition 2, we conclude that
13 If it is the (second order) ∀I rule, then w = ΛXu, A = ∀XB and Γ u : B (and X does not occur free in the formulas of Γ). So, w = ΛXu, since X = X 1 , . . . , X m . Suppose |F | = C and st(F ) = s; we have to prove that wC = u[C/X] s B [F /X] , which amounts to show that the induction hypothesis can be applied to u. For this purpose, it is enough to observe that for i = 1, . . . , n
14 If it is the (second order) ∃E rule, then w = u|A|t Γ t : ∀X. B → A and Γ u : ∃XB, with X not occurring free in A. By inductive hypothesis on u, u s ∃XB; hence u = C, v and v s B [F /X] , where |F | = C and st(F ) = s. By induction hypothesis on t, t s ∀X. B → A and hence
We thus obtain by saturation (proposition 1)
So, w = |C|, u . Moreover, by induction hypothesis
Let F be such that |F | = |C|, st(F ) = s and
(F is well defined by proposition 1). By proposition 2
which is the thesis. 17 If it is a Post rule, then w = u 1 u 2 · · · u n and Γ u i : P i . So, w = u 1 u 2 · · · u n . First, suppose that, for i = 1, . . . , n, u i [s] = U i and w[s] = U . By induction hypothesis, u i s P i , for i = 1, . . . , n. Therefore, dom(U i ) ∩ dom(s) = ∅, and thus also dom(U ) ∩ dom(s) = ∅. Suppose now that U = ∅; then we have to prove that P [s] = True. It suffices to prove that
18 If is the excluded middle axiom EM 1 , then w s EM 1 : this is Proposition 3.
19 If it is a Φ-axiom rule, then
Let n, m be two arbitrary numerals. We have to prove that wnm s P a (n, m) ⇒ Bool P a (n, Φ a n)
There are two cases:
(a) P a (n, m) ⇒ Bool P a (n, s a n) = True. In this case, wnm[s] = ∅ and we have only to check that dom(s) ∩ dom(∅) = ∅, which is trivial.
(b) P a (n, m) ⇒ Bool P a (n, s a n) = False. Then, P a nm = True and P a ns a n = False. Moreover wnm[s] = mkupd a n m = U with U = {(a, n, m)}. We have first to check that U is sound (see definition 7): this follows from P a nm = True. Then we have to verify that dom(s) ∩ dom(U ) = ∅: indeed, dom(U ) = {(a, n)}, and by definition 7, P a ns a (n) = False implies (a, n) / ∈ dom(s). Finally, we have to check that U = ∅, which is indeed true.
As corollary of the Adequacy theorem 5, we obtain the main theorem.
Theorem 6. If A is a closed formula such that HAS + EM 1 + SK 1 t : A, then t A.
Witness Extraction with Interactive Realizability
In this section, we turn our attention to a crucial problem, which is an important test for any realizability semantics of classical Arithmetic: the witness extraction problem for Π 0 2 -formulas. Given a realizer t ∀x N ∃y N P xy, where P xy : Bool is a term of Gödel's T, one is asked to extract from t a non-trivial program taking as input a numeral n and yielding as output a witness for the formula ∃y N P ny (that is, a numeral m such that P nm = True). In the case of Interactive realizability, the problem of computing that witness can be reduced to finding a "zero" for a suitable term u of type U, that is a state s : S such that u[s] = ∅. Indeed, given any numeral n and state s, the following implications hold:
Therefore, if s is a zero of π 1 (tn), then π 0 (tn) is equal in the state s to some witness m of the formula ∃y N P ny. Intuitively, a zero for π 1 (tn) represents a sufficient amount of information to compute the required witness. In the rest of the paper, we will show how to compute such a zero. We propose the Iterative Method, which is very simple, easy to understand and provides an algorithm that can be directly written in pure lambda calculus. However, the proof of correctness uses the Axiom of Choice. The problems of finding an algorithm directly formalizable in system F and of proving constructively its correctness will be treated in a forthcoming paper.
The Iterative Method
If t ∀x N ∃y N P xy and u := π 0 (tn), the interpretation of u : U is that of a state-extending operator. That is, given a state s, since u[s] represents new information improving the approximation s of the oracle Φ, it is natural to associate to u the state-extending operator λs S . s ⊕ u [s] . The idea of the Iterative Method is to start from an arbitrary state and apply this state-extending operator until a zero of u is reached. Such series of state extensions represents a terminating learning process.
Theorem 7 (Zero Theorem). Let P xy : Bool be a term of Gödel's T and suppose t ∀x N ∃y N P xy. Let n be any numeral, define u := π 1 (tn) and let s be any state. Define, by induction on n, a sequence {s n } n∈N of states as follows: Then, {s n } n∈N is weakly increasing and there exists a number k such that u[s k ] = ∅.
Proof. We first prove that s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . is a weakly increasing chain. Suppose s i (a, n) = s i+i (a, n): we have to prove that (a, n) ∈ dom(s i+1 ) and (a, n) / ∈ dom(s i ). By definition of s i+1 , if it were is u[s i ] a n = False, then we would have s i (a, n) = s i+i (a, n), contradiction. Thus, is u[s i ] a n = True, and if we consider the update U such that U = u[s i ], we have:
is U a n = True that is, (a, n) ∈ dom(U ), and for some m, (a, n, m) ∈ U . If we let l = π 0 (tn)[s i ], then u si P nl; this means that U is sound and dom(s i ) ∩ dom(U ) = ∅. From dom(s i ) ∩ dom(U ) = ∅ and (a, n) ∈ dom(U ) we obtain (a, n) / ∈ dom(s i ). From U is sound and (a, n, m) ∈ U we obtain P a nm = True. By definition, s i+1 (a, n) = get u[s i ] a n = get U a n = m Therefore, s i+1 (a, n) = m and by definition 7 of dom, we have that (a, n) ∈ dom(s i+1 ). We conclude that s 0 , s 1 , s 2 , . . . is weakly increasing. Now, by theorem 4, u converges over the chain {s i } i∈N : there exists k ∈ N such that for and hence it must be that u[s k+1 ] = ∅, which is the thesis.
We are now able to extract from any realizer t ∀x N ∃y N P xy, with P xy : Bool term of Gödel's T, a recursive map f from the set of numerals to the set of numerals, such that P nf (n) = True for all numerals n.
Theorem 8 (Witness Extraction via the Iterative Method). Suppose that t ∀x N ∃y N P xy, where P xy : Bool is a term of Gödel's T. Then, from t one can effectively define a recursive function f from the set of numerals to the set of numerals such that for every numeral n, P n(f (n)) = True. and fix a numeral n. By unfolding the definition of realizability with respect to zero(n), we have that tn zero(n) ∃y N P ny and hence π 1 (tn) zero(n) P n(f (n)) that is to say vn[zero(n)] = ∅ =⇒ P n(f (n)) = True and therefore P n(f (n)) = True which is the thesis.
The recursive function f of theorem 8 is not directly representable in F, since it uses unbounded iteration to compute zeros of atomic realizers, as in the proof of the zero theorem 7. However, f is easily representable in pure lambda calculus, by means of any fixed point combinator. It is remarkable that one does not need control operators at all to write f quite directly in a purely functional language (differently from what happens with Krivine classical realizability (Krivine 2009; Miquel 2009) ).
One may then wonder how it is implemented backtracking in our extracted programs: control operators have precisely that function in (Krivine 2009 ). The answer is that backtracking is implemented automatically in the iteration of the state-extending operator u of theorem 7. More precisely, let us consider the chain {s n } n∈N defined in the statement of theorem 7. When u is evaluated in s n , and it is different from ∅, then dom(s n+1 ) = dom(s n ⊕ u[s n ]) is strictly larger than dom(s n ). In particular, for some pair of numerals (i, j), there is a k such that (i, j, k) belongs to the update denoted by u[s n ] and it holds that k = s n+1 (i, j) = s n (i, j). The normalization of u[s n+1 ] is perfectly equal to the normalization of u[s n ] up to the first point in which s n+1 (i, j) is computed: this is the backtracking point. Instead of putting control operators in u[s n ] to save all possible backtracking points and to jump directly to the right one (which is discovered by reducing u[s n ] to an update), the Iterative Method recomputes u[s n+1 ] from scratch. In this way, the backtracking point is rencountered, but with a waste of resources. Again, this issue will be addressed in a forthcoming paper.
